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Invisible Teachers:

By Robert F. Nagel

law-school classrooms is that
n odd fact about behavior in
polite, decent students will occasionally (and apparently unthinkingly)
be rude. A student who is normally
attentive in personal conversation may,
in the classroom, slump sullenly in his
chair or feign sleep or read a newspaper.
This sort of behavior is not explainable
simply as a reaction to the legendary
unpleasantness of the Socratic method
or to the boredom of a particular class.
Everyone has memories going back to
grade school of students engaging in
open misbehavior-passing notes,
chewing gum, staring out windows,
brazenly cheating. From the beginning
of formal education to its end, what
seems to characterize and partially to
explain such classroom activity is a
sense of invisibility. In some peculiar
way students are simply unaware of the
fact that the teacher who is standing
only a few yards away can clearly see
them. Thus it does not occur to the
normally polite law student that his
boorish behavior is an affront to the
teacher before him. Having been a law
student in the turbulent period around
1970, 1 remember occasional angry,
even obscene, outbursts in the classroom; and I believe that even those
students, at the moment they were so
loudly demanding notice, did not
understand that they could be seen
quite plainly.
The obvious-and incomplete-explanation for students' illusion of
invisibility is their low self-esteem.
Especially with respect to legal education, it is common to suppose that the
role of the student is subordinate, that
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students feel powerless, inadequate,
and exploited in the classroom. From
this assumption it is a small leap to the
conclusion that law students, feeling
unimportant, also feel as if they are not
fully present, that they are, in a sense,
invisible. But anyone who has been a
teacher must recognize that something
more complex is going on. As an
illustration, consider this incident: At a
bar-association cocktail party, I am
enjoying a pleasant conversation with a
local practitioner. He asks how things
are at the law school, and there is other
small talk. Then, without any change of
mood or tone, the practitioner says, "I
could teach those students more in
three weeks about practicing law than
they learn in three years at the law
school." Now, I am not especially
suprised at this idea-I have heard
many criticisms of "impractical" legal
education before. Everyone, including
teachers, expects criticism from time to
time. The comment is suprising in that
the practitioner does not seem at all
embarassed by his insult. He does not
provide the softener so customary in
such circumstances-he does not add,
for example, "except for a few of the
good teachers." He does not seem to
expect me to argue or to be angry. He is
perfectly matter of fact. In short, to this
individual I am not enough of a person
to be insulted. I am not fully there.
I have heard similar anecdotes from
many teachers: the senior professor
referred to in public with friendly
amusement and obvious condescension; the hard-working younger teacher
asked when he intends to get a real job.
I have heard enough to suggest that

such experiences form part of the
normal fabric of the law teacher's life. It
is not that teachers are especially
subject to insult; it is that they are not
expected to notice or respond. Such
episodes suggest a perverse explanation
for the feeling of invisibility that so many
students apparently have. Perhaps
students do not recognize that there is
anyone in front of the room to look
back and see them. It is the teacher who
is invisible. Of course, students see
their teachers at the podium. They
listen to them and watch them. But in
some way they do not really believe that
it is a person up there.
Students' attempts to depersonalize
and limit their teachers are evident in an
array of commonly observed reactions
to law school. Students come to
believe, at least from time to time, if not
permanently, that law teachers do not
notice them or care about them. They
find evidence for this in the fact that a
teacher might not remember a name
during a conversation in the hall or in
fact that he passed too quickly over a
point in class or in his apparent
obliviousness to how the classroom
experience affects students. Teachers
are perceived as ignoring their students'
discomfort and making light of ideas
that are offered seriously. This is an
adult version of "my teacher cannot see
me."
As faculty, we know that many
colleagues remember students by name,
years and even decades after they have
graduated. I have heard accounts of
specific answers given to questions
posed many years earlier. Teachers
frequently talk fondly (and sometimes
not so fondly) of students, including
students from long ago. Moreover,
most teachers are well aware of
discomfort in class-or at least assume
that some students are somewhat
uncomfortable. But, of course, teachers
have in mind objectives other than
responding openly to discomfort during the class period. After all, the
teacher is there to teach and expects to
devote his time and effort to that
objective. Most teachers are accutely
sensitive to whether students are
interested, whether they seem to be
learning, whether the class is going well.
Teaching is our occupation and it is the
thing to which our self-esteem is
attached. That students so often cannot
continued on page 34
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recognize these facts is indicative of the
caricature to which they are so powerfully impelled.
Another example of the same perceptual quirk is the belief that law
teachers try to hurt students' feelings in
class. Many students see their teachers
as a self-selected group of the meanest
of the legal profession, a group that
seems to get a personal thrill out of
brow beating students. Every reasonable answer begets just another question, and it is frustrating and embarassing to be put on the spot. But to
conclude, because of such feelings, that
the teacher is trying to hurt is for the
student to confuse his personal reactions with the motives of the
professor. It is to ignore the teacher as a
person in his own right, with his own
objectives. The teacher's aim is to
enable the student to respond under
pressure, even in situations where at
first the student thinks he has no
response. The objective is to encourage
the student to think and communicate
even more precisely and effectively than
he thought he could. Law students are
in training to be professional advocates
and counselors. For a professional,
arguments cannot be merely adequate
or normal or bright. Lawyers are paid
to be always clear and sometimes
moving and brilliant in their communications; they must meet this professional obligation even when they feel
embarrassed, even when they are
distracted, even when at first they think
they have no response.
A third example is the belief that the
teacher knows everything. I hesitate to
mention this particular misperception
as it does not normally last past the
third week of classes. At first impression this perception seems inconsistent
with my model because it appears to
acknowledge and enlarge the capacities
of the teacher. But the real reason
students want to believe their teachers
know everything is to justify their
conclusion that it is unreasonable to
expect them to live up to the standard
the teacher appears to set. If a teacher
commands a kind of superhuman
excellence or perfection, students are
excused from paying attention to the
standards he is trying to communicate.
In short, he can be ignored. In fact, of
course, teachers do not normally ask
questions if they are sure of the
answers. They are ultimately seeking to
interest students in questions that they
34-The Law Forum/Spring, i984

find interesting, important, and difficult to answer. The teacher thinks that
the questions he puts are hard questions,
that they are worthy of students'
attention and thought because they are
hard. He surely does not often assume
that there are clear answers to the
questions, let alone that he holds the
answers.
A fourth variation on this theme is
the belief that teachers are singlemindedly interested in legal thinking, in
legal problems, in law. They have no
self doubts, and they arrogantly insist

that students master the profession's
conventions and skills even when they
do not want to. The teacher does not
seem to know about other needs, does
not recognize that all this seriousness
will corrupt pleasant, fun-loving personalities. He does not sense that there
is something a bit narrow and even
threatening about how lawyers think. In
short, the teacher is a reduced person
with reduced vision who sees little of
the broader world.
The truth is that many teachers are
loaded with self-doubts. They have

Title
Insurance
and
Judgment
Reports
Our Owners' or

Mortgagee Title Insurance policies
are available to you
and your clients.

SAFECO

TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF MARYLAND
TITLE BUILDING!ST PAUL AND LEXINGTON STREETS
BALTIMORE. MARYLAND 212G2/(301) 727-3700

already mastered the skills that they are
trying to impart and are familiar with
the conventions of the profession. They
know that putting legal skills into
action can do a lot of harm. They have
seen legal arguments intensify and even
initiate disagreements rather than resolve them; they have seen students
who-having just learned to say "inter
alia" or divide their arguments into
three numbered sections (and even
perhaps remember the third part of the
argument)-feel that because of these
skills they have somehow become
superior to other citizens; they have
seen first-year law students disdain the
"fuzzy" thinking of other citizens and
even of their spouses and friends, so
that they exhibit an aggresive overconfidence that is sometimes never
outgrown; they are well aware of judges
who think that some special skill
entitles them to a superior place in the
resolution of social problems. Teachers
may love their craft and the skills of
their profession, but they are at least as
aware of the limitations as anyone else.
They spend a great deal of their
academic effort questioning basic assumptions about how law is used, at
attempting to locate the limitations of
law. They want students to master the
techniques and then to transcend them.
Sooner or later (and this misperception tends to last indefinitely) many
students come to believe that their
teachers know nothing, are not there at
all. The most common version of this
belief is that teachers are not interested
in practical things. Put bluntly, students
adopt this attitude because their teachers
insist that they continue thinking about
problems when they are tired of them.
Students and alumni criticize teachers
as "too abstract," "too impractical,"
"too academic," but these are merely
euphemisms for exasperation. Most law
teachers have practiced law, many still
do, and some will go back to the
practice full time. Of course, the
faculty's academic interests may differ
from the students' interests from time
to time, but there is no real doubt that
the skills being taught are generally the
skills needed in practice. Law students
are taught to be precise, to develop the
capacity to forsee potential weaknesses
in their own arguments, to be orderly,
to be complete, to be imaginative in the
construction of legal arguments. These
are the intellectual skills that the
practice of law requires.
Another version of the belief that the
teacher knows nothing is the distres-

singly common view that law teachers
are trying to convince their students
that there are always two sides to every
argument. Many law students believe
they have seen deeply into the purposes
of legal education when they conclude
that any one argument is as good as any
other, that the important thing is just to
be able to come up with an argument.
Students might come to this conclusion
because teachers tend to raise additional
questions in response to most answers.
The perceived message is that the
student is to learn to make an
argument, any argument; one must be
as good as another since there are
problems with all arguments. This
perception is almost completely wrong.
Teachers, of course, question answers
so that students will learn to discover
possible weaknesses in even their
strongest arguments. Moreover, most
teachers want students to be able to
judge quality for themselves. They do
not make a habit of telling students
when their answers are "right" because
a lawyer must learn to judge independently, by his own standards, when an
argument is good enough. The point of
all those questions is, in fact, to show
students how to judge quality in
argument, not to urge the view that
quality is irrelevant.
I do not mean these observations to
be self-serving. There is some truth in
all the misperceptions that I have
described. Every faculty member has
many weaknesses, as does legal education in general. But the misperceptions
distort-even oppose-what I think
most law teachers know to be true. In
this way they illustrate how powerful is
the urge that students feel to diminish
their teachers. Legal education is still
fairly rigorous, and it involves many
real frustrations and disappointments.
Only some of these are caused by
faculty members. To caricature and
ultimately to try to eliminate the
teacher that stands in front of them is a
way for students to make the teacher
responsible for all the difficulties
associated with becoming educated in
law. Law students in this regard only
share (and perhaps enlarge) the near
universal desire of students to avoid
taking responsibility for their own
education. Sadly, like any group subject
to fairly constant misperception,
teachers are under pressure to internalize the distorted image of themselves reflected in their students' eyes.
Much of the malaise in legal education
today may be as much a consequence of

the resulting personal unhappiness as it
is of any real ineffectiveness inherent in
prevalent teaching techniques.
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